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The Sheriff of Jefferson County ha interyened and claims
of the Receiver $70,341.95 on account of state taxes f9r the years
:atioinalB34nk- o -Ken1930 and 1031 on shares of stoAk 6f'the
tuky held by -the BancoKentucky Company.
The Receiver has filed a specik denurer to the Sheriff's
intervlenag petition and a motion to strike thbrefr6ii, - which
both' sides adree shall be tiated as raising the 'questibn -f %h
stockholder's liability to the state.

The Commonwealth of Kentucky has imposed an annual
tax of fifty cents on each one hundreddollars of the, fair cash
value of the shares of stock of ,all banks, state- and national,
and has required that the tax shall be paid to the sheriff "by
for and on behalf of the owners of-such shares
such banks..
of stock" (Ky Stats., see. 4092).- It is well. settled -that
national bank shares may be taxed in tins manner and that no
objection can be made to the mode of collection adopted, thatis
to say, the requirement that the tax, shall 'be paid o the state
by the bank itself (First Natiorka Bank of Lousvilla v. ComTinder tins statute,
monwealth 'of Kentucky, 9 Wall. 353)
it was the primary duty of the National Bankr of Kentucky to
* Although this case Is pending in the Court of Appeals, this opinIon of Hon. Lafon Allen, judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court, is published because of the interesting and very valuable account of the
history of bank taxation in Kentucky contained therein. -
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pay the taxes in question. It has not done so because in November, 1930, it closed its doors and was placed in the hands of
a receiver. In the ease of Rosenblatt v. Johnsto&n (104 U. S.
462) the possibility of charging such a tax claim upon assets of
a national bank in the hands of a receiver was denied, not because of the receivership, but because it could not have been
done even when the bank was a going concern. The tax was
not a tax upon the bank but upon its shares, which were not
the property of the bank. The statement made in the opinion
in that case that the shares were taxable in the hands of the
owners, under section 5219, U. S. Revised Statutes, is no longer
in point, since the language upon which that observation was
based had been stricken out of the statute within the last ten
years. It is clear, however, that if these taxes are to be collected
at all, they must be collected from shareholders and that is what
is attempted to be done in this ease.
It will be remembered that the BancoKentucky Company
waq the holder of almost all of the shares of the National Bank
of Kentucky. It is true that it did not hold the legal tifie to
these shares, but held "participation certificates" issued by the
trustees of a pool of shares both of the Bank of Kentucky and of
the Louisville Trust Company. It was, however, the beneficial owner of a proportionate interest in the pooled shares and,
in view of section 4023, Kentucky Statutes, which makes the
holder of the equitable title to property liable for taxes thereon,
it can not be claimed that the BancoKentucky Company is not
liable for these taxes solely because it did not hold the legal
title to the shares.
The ease, then, presents two questions. The first is whether
or not the BancoKentucky Company is relieved from this tax
because our statute contains no express requirement that the
holder of bank shares shall, in any event, pay the tax to the
state. It does provide that the bank shall pay such taxes "for
and on behalf of the owners of such shares", but it is a matter
of common knowledge that the banks have never charged these
payments to shareholders nor demanded reimbursement from
them, but have merely treated the tax payments as operating
expenses, a practice which is expressly authorized by the Federal income tax law (Revenue Act, 1926-28-32; see. 23d). It

ST0CKHOLDER's LBnaTY Fop TAx oN BANK SaEtxs

611

is argued that, even if the bank be entitled to reimbursement
from the shareholder, nevertheless the shareholder is under no
duty to pay the tax to the state, since the stathte does not require him to do so. It is said that it was within the power of
the state to adopt the exclusive method of collection through
the bank, so long as it did not deprive the bank of the right to
reimbursement by the shareholder, and that the state, having
elected to look alone to the bank for payment, can look nowhere

else.
The second question is whether or not such a collection from
a shareholder, if allowed in any case, will be allowed against a
nne-resident shareholder, since section 4020, Kentucky Statutes,
provides that
"the situs of intangible personal property for purposes of taxation
shall be at the residence of the real or beneficial owner, and not at
the residence of the fiduciary or agent having custody or possession
of same."

It is said that, since the BancoKentucky Company is a
Delaware corporation, its legal residence is in that state and its
shares in the National Bank of Kentucky, being intangible personal property, are consequently not taxable here. It is obvious
that this theory calls in question the effect of the Federal statute
(U. S. Code, Title 12, see. 548) which in, in part, as follows:
"The shares of any national banking association owned by nonresidents of any State, shall be taxed by the taxing district or by the
State where the association is located and not elsewhere; and such
association shall make return of such shares and pay the tax thereon
as agent of such non-resident shareholders."

Coming now to consider the question whether or not the
Statutes of Kentucky authorize such a proceeding as this, by
which the Commonwealth seeks to collect taxes on bank shares
from the owners of such shares, I think it will be helpful to review briefly the history of bank taxation in this state. That
history falls naturally into three periods, as follows:
(A) The period from the adoption of the Second Constitation, in 1799, to the adoption of the Third Constitutution, in 1850;
(B) The period from the adoption of the Third Constitu-
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tion,. in 1850, to the, adoption of the Fourth Constitution, M 1891;
(C) The period from the-adoption of the Fourth Constitution, in I891, to the present time.

(A) THiE PERIOD FROM TfE ADOPTION OF TE' SECOND
CONSTITUTION, IN 1799, TO THE ADOPTION OF THE
THIRD CONSTITUTION,N 1850:

During ths period, the taxation of banks, or of interests
in them, was fixed exclusively (except as to the Bank of the
United States, hereinafter noted) in the charters granted to
state banks. The firt -mc6rp~rated bank in this state was the
Bank of Kentucky, which was.-chartered, in,1806. No provision
for taxation was made in that charter but by an amendment
adopted in 1814 (Act of January -31, 1814)j the Bank was required to pay an annual. tax to the state of, 25, cents on each
share of one' hundred dollars' and the president and directors,
or-the cashier, were required, to retain the amount of taxes out
of earnings available for-aividendg and. to 'pay the tax into the
state -treasury upon' penalty' of 'a fine of $1,500 for failure to
do so.

'

After a brief- eriod of.,,rosperity following the clse of the
War of 1812, the banking s em -of Kentucky fell a victim to a
"depression", the results of which were felt for two or three
decades. One of the remedies adopted for these public ills was
the authorization of the assue of paper money, in large volume
and to that end, a number of-bank charters were granted (fifty
or sixty-of them between 1818 and 1835), each with liberal power
to ,ssue circulating notes,, redeemable, not m specie, but in the
notes of the, "old" Bank of Kentucky, which had itself suspended specie payments. All. of these .arters contained a provision for the taxaion of shares, to be paid into the state treasury, in each instance by officers of the bank. The only -variable
feature was the rate of taxation which was in some instances 25
cents, in some 40 cents and in others 50 cents a share.
,This was the system which prevailed throughout this period.
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The time was, however, enlivened by two or three attenpts to
tax the Bank of the United. States, which in Kentucky; as elsewhere, had come, to enjoy an unpopularity; not wholly deserved. The attempts made to tax its branches, or- offices of
deposit and discount," in Kentucky were dictated not so much
by a desire to raise revenue as by a desire to dive this national
ifistitution out of the state. .By an Act of February 3, 1818,
each branch was required to pay a tax of $5,000 annually to'the
state, which might, however, be discharged by the payment of
50 cents on each $100 of average capital employed or 25 cents for
each $100 of the amount of bills under -discount on Marek 10th,
in each year., The president, directors and cashier of each
branch were made jointly and severally liable for a fine ,of
$10,000 for failure to pay the tax and each-subordinate officer
or agent of the branch was made liable -o a fine of $5,000 '2for
every such failure or refusal.'; This act was held invalid in Cdn&nmonwealth v. Morrison (2 A. K, Mar. 75).' The court expressed
a unanimous conviction that the Act 'of Congress, authorizing
the Bank to establish branches in the state, ought-to be held
unconstitutional and that consequently the right of the state to
tax the capital stock of 'such branches should be conceded. Indeed, Judge Owsley and Judge Rowan thought that the state
should be allowed to lay the tax, even if the Act of Congress was.
valid. But, in the end Chief Justice Boyle and' Judge Owsley
bowed to the authority of MeCullock v. Marylawd (4 Wheat.
316), which had been decided only a few months earlier, and
held the tax unconstitutional. Judge Rowan, however, who
wrote the opinion of the court, expressing an impassioned resentment of this intrusion by the national government, refused,
like the heroic Casabianca, to leave the place whence all but
he had fled, and dissented, not only 'fromhis colleagues, but
also from the Supreme Court.
Judge Rowan's example was promptly followed by the
General Assembly. Within a month after the decision in the
Morrison Case it passed the Act of January 28, 1819, by which
it was provided that any person establishing an office of discount and deposit within the state, without having obtained a
charter from the state, should pay an annual tax of $60,000, in
monthly installments of $5,000; provided, however, that, if the
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president and directors should, before March 4, 1819, inform the
Governor of their intention to withdraw, the tax should not be
enforced; but, if withdrawal did not take place by that date,
the full tax was to be collected and, thereafter, the discount
of notes, lending of money and all other banking business was
prohibited, except the receipt and disbursement or transmission of Federal revenues. What became of tlhls minatory statute
I do not know. Apparently there was no effort to enforce it,
since the Bank of the United States continued to conduct business in Kentucky until President Jackson overthrew it.
The final attempt. to tax an interest in the Bank of the
United States was made in 1825, when tax commissioners were
required to include in each taxpayer's return any stock of the
Bank owned by him, upon which the sheriff was to collect a tax
of 25 cents a share (Act of January 12, 1825). Whether or not
this tax was actually collected I do not know. I have found no
case in which the validity of the tax was considered, probably
because the Bank of the United States went out of existence
within a few years -afterthe passage of this Act. It is the only
instance in the entire history of Kentucky of a tax on bank
shares which was expressly required to be paid by shareholders.
(B) TnE PERIOD FROM THE ADOPTION OP THE THIRD
CONSTITUTION, IN 1850, TO THE ADOPTION OP THE
FouRTH CONSTITUTION, IN 1891:
After the adoption of the Third Constitution, a revision of
the statutes was undertaken and on March 24, 1851, "An Act
to Revise the Statutes" was adopted, by which an annual tax of
50 cents was laid on each share of $100 of bank stock, to be paid
into the state treasury by the cashier of the bank. The shareholder was given express authority to deduct from his "worth
from all sources" under the "Equalization Law", any bank
stock held by him which was taxed in this state (Stanton's
Revised Statutes, 1860; Vol. II, p. 2534).
In 1854, in the case of Louisville Savings Bank v. Commoniveafth (14 B. Mon. 409), the court, in construing this Act,
stated that "the real question in dispute" was whether the tax
was to be paid by the stockholders or by the bank and held
that the bank, and not the stockholder, was liable.
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In 1864, the National Bank Act was adopted by Congress,
and in the following year the General Assembly of Kentucky
required the new national banks to pay the same tax on their
shares that was required to be paid by state banks, that is, 50
cents on each share equal to $100. In 1868, in the case of
Commonwealth v. First National Bank of Louisville (4 Bush
98), this act was upheld, upon grounds stated in the opinion as

follows:
"As the tax is laid upon the shares, and not upon the capital of
the bank, it is really and bonafidely (sic) a tax upon the shareholders;
but as many of these are non-residents and could not be reached by
the laying of taxes upon their shares or stock, and looking alone to
them for payment, the State laws require the cashier of the banks to
pay this tax upon their shareholders
"
"Thus it will be seen that no adjudication of either the Supreme
Court of the United States or any State, has as yet decided that where
a State taxes the shares and not the capital of her own banks, and
then looks to the officers of the bank to pay this tax, instead of pursuing each individual stockholder, the same tax, to be collected the
same way, may not be assessed upon the shares in national banks."
"When the State shall only tax shares in the national banks at
the same rates, and shall collect the tax by the same means that are
applicable to the State banks, every substantial requirement of the
national bank act of Congress has been complied with."

This judgment was affirmed in First National Bank v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (9 Wall. 353). The court pointed out
that it was not an uncommon practice to require corporations to
pay taxes levied on their shareholders; that this was done by
the national government itself in collecting income taxes; that
there was nothing in the Federal Constitution or any act of
Congress forbidding it; that the transactions of national banks
were in many respects governed by state laws, which become
unconstitutional only when they incapacitate the banks from
discharging their duties to the national government; that there
was not the "remotest probability" that this would result from
the tax in question, and that consequently the rule of MeCutloch v. Maryland did not apply.
In Trustees of Eminence v. Deposit Bank of Eminence (12
Bush 538) the court defined the nature of the tax on bank stock
provided by the Act of 1851, in a novel manner and one which
is certainly out of line with both earlier and later decisions,
saying,
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"The state taxes banks upon their capital stock, but does not
do so on the ground that such stock is property owned by the banks,
but as a special tax on the corporations, the amount of which is ascertained by ascertaining the amount of their capital stock."
"That this is a special tax and not a tax on property is shown

not only by the fact that it is so denominated in the statute and so
treated in the revenue department but also by the fact that the same

tax is imposed on shares in all the banks without regard to the condition of the bank or the value of the shares."
I notice this case because it stands alone in treating the tax
on bank shares as a tax on the bank itself. Certainly, the notion
that a national bank can be required to pay a tax, "the amount
of which is ascertained by ascertaining the amount of its capital
stock", can no longer be entertained (Owensboro National Bank
v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664; First National Bank of Gulfport
v. Adams, 258 U. S. 362).
The concluding episode in the history of bank taxation
prior to the adoption of the Fourth Constitution of Kentucky
in 1891, is the passage of the famous "Hewitt Act," on May 17,
1886. This piece of legislation was an attempt to bring order
and uniformity into the system of bank taxation, which had
grown up in a somewhat haphazard manner. There were then
banks, having irrevocable charters granted besome "old"
fore 1856, and some "new" banks, having charters granted
since 1856. It appears to have been supposed that these charters
could not only be revoked but amended, under the authority of
the "Act of 1856", which had reserved the power to amend or
repeal any charter thereafter granted, but, as will appear, it
was held by the courts, for a brief time, that the method and
rate of taxation fixed in these charters constituted contracts
with the state which could not 'be changed, except by the consent of the bank or by the revocation of the entire charter. In
addition there were "old" banks whose charters had been extended after 1856 and there was a question whether or not this
brought their charters within the power of revocation reserved
by the Act of 1856.
The Hewitt Act was an attempt to settle all of these difficulties by getting all of the banks to agree to a method of taxation which would put them all on the same footing. It provided
that shares of stock in both state and national banks and in "all
corporations required by law to be taxed on their capital stock"
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should be taxed at the rate of 75 cents on each share equal to
$100, and that such banks and corporations should also pay a
tax upon their surplus and undivided profits in excess of 10 per
cent. of their capital stock. These taxes were to be paid into
the state treasury by the'bank and were to be "in full of all
tax, state, county and municipal" With respect to, the tax' on
surplus, if any bank had invested its surplus in bonds of the
United States, in an amount in excess of' 10 pe~r'cent. of its
capital stock, the excess so invested was to be exempt from the
surplus tax. Each bank that desired to do so was to give its
consent to this new form of taxation by a sealed writing delivered to the Governor. Any bank failing to give its consent
was to be taxed on its shares and its surplus and undivided
profits, for state, county and municipal purposes, at the rate
imposed "on the assessed taxable property in the hands of individuals"

This concludes the story of bank taxation between the adoption! of the Third Constitution of Kentucky n 1850 and the
adoption of the Fourth (and present) Constitution, in 1891.
During this period, there was no attempt on. the part of the
state to require holders of bank shares to return: them for assessment or to pay taxes levied upon a,.return made by the bank
itself. It is true that in the case of, the First Natwnal Ban -qf
Commonwealth, supra,:the Supreme Court declared
loutsville v,.
that the tax, although payable by the Bank, was a.tax "upon
the shares of the stockholders", and the Court of Appeals,-in
dealing with the same case, had said very much the same thing.
But both courts declared that the mode of obtanng payment
through the bank itself was not prohibited by the Act ,f Congress and was "most convenient and proper".

(0)
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Following the adoption of the new constitution in 1891, an
entirely new form of taxation of a certain class of corporations,
including banks, was adopted. This-Was the familiar "fran-
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chise" tax, which is still retained with respect to so-called
.'public service corporations". In its original form, banks and
trust companies were included in this class, but they were
subsequently omitted and a different form of tax adopted as
to them, as a result of certain court decisions, hereinafter
noticed. The somewhat elaborate plan by which the value of
the "franchise" of each such corporation was arrived at is
very familiar to Kentucky lawyers and need not be explained.
In 1895, a group of seventeen cases reached the Court of
Appeals and, since the conclusions of the court were announced
in a single opinion, they came to be known as the "Bank Tax
Cases" (97 Ky. 590). It was held that the banks, some of
which were state banks and some national banks, some "old"
banks and some "new" banks, could not be required to pay the
"franchise" tax levied on them by the Act of 1892, upon the
ground that their acceptance of the Hewitt Act constituted an
irrevocable contract and excused them from the payment of any
tax except that of 75 cents a share, fixed by that Act. Two years
later, when there had been a change in the personnel of the
Court of Appeals, this decision was overruled and it was held
that the power of repeal and amendment reserved by the Act
of 1856 authorized the revocation of contracts made under the
Hewitt Act and that consequently the "franchise" tax provision of the Act of 1892 was applicable to the banks. The
special objections made by the national banks were disposed of
very summarily, the court saying that it had been needless to
ask them to accept the Hewitt Act, since they were already
subject to taxation for state, county and municipal purposes
and it was not necessary to obtain their consent that they might
be so taxed.
This judgment, in so far as it affected state banks was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Citizens Savings Bank v.
Owensboro (173 U. S. 636). But the judgment as to national
banks was reversed in Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro
(173 U. S. 664), upon the ground that the "franchise" tax was
in fact, a tax on the property of the bank and was, therefore,
invalid, since at that time the Act of Congress (see. 5219, U. S.
Rev. St.) authorized only one form of state taxation of national
banks, namely, a tax upon the shares of the bank.
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The result of this decision was to leave Kentucky without
any express provision for the taxation of national bank shares.
A year or two later, an enterprising sheriff of Clark County included in the tax returns of certain citizens of that county
shares held by them in the Clark County National Bank. They
were duly assessed and included in tax bills issued against the
shareholders. Bean and his fellow-citizens brought a suit to
enjoin the collection of these taxes upon the ground that the
legislature had made no provision for taxing such shares. The
lower court granted the injunction and the sheriff appealed
(Scobee, Sheriff, v. Bean, et al, 109 Ky. 526).
The judgment was reversed. The. court held that the general revenue statute (Act of 1892) was broad enough in its
terms to authorize such an assessment, since the express exemption of shares in corporations that list their property implied a
requirement that shares in corporations not listing their property should be taxed to the shareholder. To the argument that
these sections. of the statute were not meant to include bank
shares, since they were taxed, in a special manner, in another
part of the Act, the court answered that, while the particular
intention of the legislature was to tax bank shares in the special
manner referred to, yet its general intention was to tax all property, as required by section 174 of the Constitution, and, since
the bank tax provisions of the statute had been held by the
Supreme Court to be invalid as to national banks, the general
statute was applicable. As to the claim that this method of
taxing national bank shares would result in a discrimination
forbidden by the Act of Congress, the court said that there was
neither pleading nor proof that this was so.
While this case was pending in the courts, the General
Assembly undertook to remedy the situation wich had been
produced by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Owensboro Bank case. By an Act of March 21, 1900, it was provided that shares of stock in each national bank in the state
should be subject to taxation for state and local purposes and
that it should be the duty of the president and cashier of each
bank to list its shares for taxation "and the bank shall be and
remain liable to the state, county, city, town and taxing district for the taxes upon said shares of stock". The Act, how-
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everl, provided that where any national bank had previously
paid taxes uipon its '" franehise", in accordance with the Act of

1892, it'should be excepted from the operation of the Act as to
the years -in which those payments had beeni made, and that,
whe're any national bank had paid taxes to the state under the
Hewitt 'Act in excess of the taxes required by this Act, it; should
be entitled to a' credit for the excess. Where the shares of any
nhtionil bank had not been listed -'at all for any year "or years
since 1892,' it -'was made 'the' duty Of the president and'cashier
_6list them, for-the years in 'which' they had been omitted.
Acting under the last mentioned provision, the sheriff of
Boyle Couny brought a proceeding in tie county court against

the Citizens National Bank of Danville to assess its shares of
sck ,.as-oitied propety, for, t eears 1892 to 1899, inelusive'.: 'The eounty ourt-made the assessment but, upon ap7
pe
the circuit court, the proceeding was dismissed, apparently upon the ground that section 49241, Kentucky Statutes
which authorizes back tax, proceedings in the county court, was
not applicable to the assessment of bank shares and that conse-

guently the county courtwa without jurisditon.

_Upon appeal from the circuit court, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings (Com.onwwowalt7,v. -Citizens, National Bank, 117 WBy. ,946). JIt was.
first, held that section. 4241 was broad enough to cover the back
assessmenI of bank shares, if, there was any, authority to assess
themat all for the, years in question. The court then dealt with
the, objection that the Act. of 1900, was in conflict with the
National Bank Act. It noted the :provision of the National
Bank Act to the, effect, that nothing in that Act should prevent
the, shares of a national bank from beinglincluded in the valuation of the personal property 'of the owner. It pointed out ,that
the, Act of, 1900 was passed for the purpose of avoiding the
effect of-' the decision of. he'Supreme Court in the OWnsboro
National,BankI Case, supra, and that it had been, held repeatedly by the, Supreme Court that a state might lay a taxon national
tank sharedarid' requirethe bank to pay the tx (First'lational
Bank-'". iomnfonweath 'of Kmtucky , supra). ' It c6nuluded
that since the bank,'as agent of its sharehflders, had omitted to
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,list the sharesfor, the years in question, it was proper, for-the
sheriff to proceed against it under section 4241.'
.
The question of the constitutionality-'of, the statuteL;was
raised but the court disposed of it with-the mere stAtemnt'that
the "agent" of stockholders (that is, the bank) could tio ,rise
the question. It will be seen that, only two years later-the
Court of Appeals held that the -same act was invalid becausle
of a discrimination against national-banks, although the qtiistion was raised by the "agent" of stockholders ' (that is,' thi
bank). (Citiens,NationalBank of Lebanon v. Burton, Sheriff,
121 Ky. 876.)
.
Since Commonwealth v. Citizens National Bank, sup-ra,,ilvolved an-act which required the'6fficei of a national bank to
ieturn its shares of stock 'n s'otdo' for taxation -andto6 pay the
tax upon them, although as agent for the owner, it is interesting
to note the somewhat similar case of Aberdeen'Bank '. thehiis
County (166 U. S. 440).1 A statute of the state -of Washington
required all banks, including national banks, to returli a verified statement showing the amount of its paid-up capital, siirplus and undivided profits, which Was to be'taxed, "as other like
property in the, state is assessed 'and taxed". -The Act provided
that each bank should pay the tax "as the agent of each' of its
shareholders . . . and pay the 'same 'out of' (its) individual
profit account or charge same to (its) expense account, '61" to
the accounts of such shareholders, owners or, owner in' proportion to their ownership". The Supreme Court held that this
was, in effect, a tax upon the shares of stockholders 'and that the
requirement that the bank should pay the whole tax as agent of
stockholders was not inconsistent with the National Bank Act.
In 1906, in Citizens Nationio2 Bank of Lebanon 'v. Burton,
Sheriff, supra, it was held, as stated above, that there was a
discrimination against national banks because the deduction'of
tax-exempt bonds must be allowed in taxing the "franchises"
of state banks and could not be allowed in taxing the' shares of
national banks. It followed that no-tax at all could be levied
on shares of national banks, so long as state banks were required
to pay the "franchise" tax. When this decision was handed
down the General Assembly was in session and it immediately
amended the law so as to cure the defect upon which that de*'
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cision was based. It was provided that both national banks and
state banks should be taxed on their shares and that the tax in
each instance should be paid by the bank "for and on behalf
of the owners of such shares of stock" (Act of March 15, 1906).
This put an end to the taxation of the "franchise" of a state
bank and thus did away with the deduction of tax exempt bonds
held by them. With this exception, no substantial change was
made in the manner of assessment, since the method of valuing
national bank shares in solido differed hardly at all from the
former method of valuing the "franchise" of a state bank.
In 1907 the effect of this change in our tax law was announced
in the case of Hager, Auditor, v. Citizens National Bank of
Lebanon (127 Ky. 192). The complainant, Citizens National
Bank, had been the complainant in the Burton Case, supra. In
that case it had succeeded in escaping a tax on its shares because of the discrimination in favor of state banks in allowing
the latter to deduct tax-exempt bonds in fixing the value of
their "franchises". In this new case the same bank complained
that the tax on its shares was inv4lid for failure to allow the
deduction of tax-exempt bonds, not because this resulted in a
discrimination against it, but because the tax was, in effect, a
tax on the bonds. The court concluded, upon the authority of
First National Bank v. Chehalis County, supra, that a tax upon
shares of national banks, without deduetion of tax exempt bonds,
was a tax, not upon the bank, but upon the bank's shares and
was, therefore, allowable. In the Chehais County Case, the
statute of the state of Washington had expressly provided that
a national bank paying this tax might charge it ratably, to its
shareholders, whereas the Kentucky Act of 1906 contained no
such provision- The court, however, said that no distinction
between the cases could be based upon this ground "because
the unequivocal right of recovery (from shareholders) exists
under our Act, although not given in express terms".
In 1924 (Act of March 14, 1924) bank shares were made
taxable only for state purposes and at the rate of 50 cents on
each $100 of "their fair cash value", such tax to be paid to the
sheriff by the bank, "for and on behalf of the owners of such
shares of stock": Provided, however, that the county, city, town
or school district in which the bank was located might levy taxes
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Thus the

One of the striking features of this history is that the requirement that taxes upon bank shares should be paid by the
bank itself was adopted in the very beginning and has never
been abandoned. The practice of taxing bank shares was,
therefore, not a mere evasion of the decision in Mculloch v.
Maryland and similar cases, denying the right of a state to tax
banks created by Act of Congress. It was a practice adopted
with reference to the Bank of Kentucky by the Act of January
31, 1814, and with reference to the Bank of the United States
by the Act of February 3, 1818, both of which Acts were passed
prior to the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland.
Another striking thing is that, with the single exception
of the Act of 1825, dealing with shares of the Bank of the United
States, there has never been a single attempt on the part of
the General Assembly of Kentucky to require the holders of
bank shares to pay the taxes levied on them. It is true, as has
been pointed out, that, when the tax on national bank "franchises" had been stricken down by the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, by what seems a rather strained construction
of the Act of 1892, held that the payment of a tax on national
bank shares might be required of the shareholder. That this
was not contemplated by the legislature when it adopted the
Act of 1892 is made plain by the fact that, in that very Act, it
undertook to tax the "franchise" of each national bank and
exonerated the holder of its shares. Consequently it is still true
that the General Assembly (with the negligible exception of
1825) has never expressly required the holders of bank shares
to pay a tax upon them.
The doctrine of the disability of a state to tax a national
bank had its rise in McCulloch v. Maryland. That disability did
not result from any infirmity in the state itself, since it was admitted to have the power to tax persons and property within
its jurisdiction, by virtue of a sovereignty which antedated the
national Constitution and was expressly preserved by that instrument. The state, therefore, in exercising its power to tax,
was not required to rely upon any grant of power from the
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national government, since the powers of the latter government
were themselves derived from a grant by the states.
The disability resulted from the concession made by the
states that a legitimate exercise by the national government
of one of its delegated powers should be supreme (Constitution,
United States, Article VI). It having been decided that the
incorporation by Congress of a bank (or system of banks) was
a legitimate exercise of an "implied power"-that is, of a
power "proper for carrying into execution" powers expressly
granted-it followed, as a necessary inference from the supremacy of the national government in its field, that a state
could exercise, upon this instrument of national government,
none of its reserved powers which, if exercised to its fullest
extent, would impair or destroy the usefulness of that instrument.
I mention this historic argument because it seems to me
to contain implications which have an important bearing upon
the decisions of this case. The state has, by virtue of its own
sovereignty, the power to tax shares of corporate stock in the
hands of its residents. This power extends to shares in national
banks, since it has been held by the Supreme Court that the
taxation of such shares does not offer "the remotest possibility"
of an impairment of the usefulness of those banks as instruments of national government, even though the bank itself be
required to pay the tax on behalf of its shareholders (First
National Bank v. Camonwealth of Kentucky, supra).
The National Bank Act, in its original form (see. 5219,
Rev. St.), contained the following expression:
"Nothing herein shall prevent all shares in any association from
being included in the valuation of the personal property of the owner
or holder of such shares, in assessing taxes imposed by authority of the
State within which the association is located."
There words (which were dropped from the Statute in

1.926) were not intended as an authorization to the states to tax
national bank shares in the manner indicated but were merely
an acknowledgment by Congress of a power already inherent in
the states. We may, therefore, put aside the National Bank
Act and treat the question as if it were merely a question of
taxing the shares of a state bank.
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It is a rule universally recognized- that statutes levying
taxes are to be strictly ,construed and cannot be extended by
implication (Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151) All doubts: as to
the meaning of such a statute are to be resolved against the taxing authority (Shwab v. Doyle, 256 U. S. 259). In City of Newport v. Kato&(189 Ky 300, 224 S. W 844) the court said
"It is a trite saying that 'the power to tax is the power to destroy',
and it must be conceded that the tendency of the times lends credence
to the truth of that saying. It is therefore necessary for the pr6tection of the citizen that the authority for the assessment and collection
of taxes should clearly appear, and that all essential requisites for
conferring that authority should be at least substantially ohoervedl."

Certainly it cannot be said that "the auth*prity for the
assessment and collection" of the tax in question 'fclearly appears" in the statutes of this state.
I conclude that the Commonwealth has no authority to require the tax in questaon to be paid by the defendant shareholder. The situation here is very different from.the situation
dealt with in Sobee, Sherzff, v. Bean, supra. When that case
was decided, the Supreme Court had held invalid the statute
by whnch alone national bank shares had been- taxed and, there
was, therefore, no method of taxing the shares of any national,
bank, unless the owner could be required to return them for
taxation in'his name. But in the present case, there is no such
emergency There is m effect aii 'Act which - equlres these
shares to be assessed against the bank and to be- paid by the
bank. Plaintiff relies solely upon the impossibility of coledting
from an insolvent bank. It seems to me that -this does not
authorize the relief prayed. As has-been repeatedly held,'the,
state had the right to require the assessment of bank shares
in solidO and to require payment by tire-bank. Having elected
tis method exclusively, it cannot now resort to a new and unauthorized method, merely because collection is impossible in an
asolated case.
The second question stated in the opening part of this
opinion is whether or not the tax in question could be enforced
against a non-resident shareholder, even though it 1could be enforced against resident shareholders. As has been pointed out,
the National Bank Act expressly provides that bank shares

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

owned by non-residents of any state shall be taxed in the state
where the bank is located, "and not elsewhere". As a means
of determining the effect of this provision, I propose, first, to
consider whether the taxing power of the state would extend
to bank shares held by non-residents, if there were no such
provision.
One of the most recent cases on this subject is Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton (270 U. S. 69). That case involved an act of the legislature of North Carolina which laid a
tax on the transfer of property by will or inheritance. It included, in the case of the death of a non-resident, "such property or any part thereof within this state". The act itself defined these words as including shares of stock in a foreign corporation, if 50 per cent. or more of its property was located in
North Carolina, the valuation of such shares to be in the proportion to their total value which the property owned in that
state bore to the total property owned by the corporation. Any
foreign corporation which transferred shares of a decedent before payment of the tax was made liable for the tax and its
property in the state was made subject to execution to satisfy
the tax claim.
The decedent, Briggs, was a resident of Rhode Island at the
time of his death and had never resided in North Carolina.
There came into the hands of his executor shares of stock in the
Reynolds Tobacco Company, of the value of more than $100,000.
The Tobacco Company was a New Jersey corporation but twothirds of its property was in North Carolina. The Commissioner of Revenue of North Carolina assessed an inheritance tax
upon these shares of $2,658. The executor applied to the office
of the Tobacco Company in New Jersey for a transfer of the
shares but the Company refused to make the transfer on the
ground that a transfer before the payment of the tax would
subject its property in North Carolina to the payment of it.
The executor thereupon paid the tax under protest and sued to
recover it.
It was held that the statute of North Carolina, in so far
as it attempted to subject shares of stock in a New Jersey corporation held by a resident of Rhode Island to a transfer tax de-
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prived the non-resident of his property without due process of
law and was, therefore, invalid.
The court rested its decision upon the broad ground that a
state has no power to tax property, or the devolution of property, of a non-resident, unless it has jurisdiction of the property
and that, in the matter of intangibles, like shares of stock, the
situs of which is with the owner, a tax can be levied only by the
state in which he resides or by the state which created the corporation. It said that this principle was equally applicable to
a property tax and a transfer tax. It rejected the claim that
stockholders were, in effect, the owners of the property of the
corporation and that consequently the taxation of their shares
should be regarded as a taxation of the property itself. It held
firmly to the view that stockholders do not own the corporate
property and consequently that jurisdiction over a non-resident's shares cannot be justified on the ground that the corporate property, or some part of it, has a situs within the state.
It was argued in that case that, while the Tobacco Company was
in legal contemplation a resident of New Jersey, it was actually
"domesticated" in North Carolina, since most of its property
was located there. But the court refused to be enticed away
from its position and declared that, whatever property the
Company might have in North Carolina or whatever business
it may have done in that state, it was still a foreign corporation and the rights of its stockholders were to be determined
accordingly.
The resemblances between that case and the instant case
are striking. In both eases the stockholder was a non-resident.
In both cases the corporation whose shares were sought to be
taxed was created by another government. In both cases most
of the property of that corporation was within the taxing state.
The parallel appears to be complete and the same result must
follow, unless the language of the National Banking Act makes
a difference.
The pertinent part of that Act has been quoted in full in
the opening paragraphs of this opinion. I repeat the quotation:
"The shares
residents of any
state where the
association shall
as agent of such

of any national banking association owned by nonstate shall be taxed by the taxing district or by the
association is located and not elsewhere; and such
make return of such shares and pay the tax thereon
non-resident shareholders."
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It is obvious that this provision was part of the general
scheme for state taxation of national bank shares in solido, at
the place where the bank is located, the tax to be paid by the
bank itself, on behalf of its shareholders. I do not think it can
be said that this provision was intended to have any effect where
that general scheme was departed from and a plan was adopted
of collecting the tax, not in a single payment by the bank, but in
I do not
separate payments from each of its shareholders.
to
collect a
a
state
think that Congress attempted to authorize
a
against
proceeding
direct
tax on national bank shares by a
non-resident shareholder. When the Congressional scheme for
the assessment of national bank shares in solido and for the collection of the whole tax from the bank breaks down, as it has
broken down in the case of the National Bank of Kentucky, then
the scheme breaks down in all of its parts and the power of the
state to collect from the individual shareholder his proportion
of the tax is subject to the same limitation as it would have been,
if the state had provided, in the first instance, that the shares
should be returned for taxation by each shareholder and the
payment made by him. If this plan had been originally adopted
by the state, then it is clear that the state could not have taxed
the shares of a non-resident, and it seems to me that the same
result must follow in the present case. The doctrine, alluded
to in the Doughtan Case, supra, that the state which creates a
corporation may provide, in creating it, for the taxation in that
state of all its shares, whether owned by residents or non-residents, cannot, I think, be applied to the Act of Congress creating national banks. Congress, having created these banks, could
doubtless provide how and where the bank itself could be taxed,
but it certainly had no power to confer upon another government the power to tax property not within its jurisdiction belonging to a nonresident, in violation of the due process clause
of the national Constitution.
I conclude, therefore, that, even if the Commonwealth of
Kentucky had the power to require a resident stockholder to
pay his proportion of the tax levied upon the whole capital stock
of the bank, it had no power to require such a payment of a nonresident stockholder.
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The special demurrer to the intervening petition is treated
as a general demurrer and is sustained.
IiAPoN Aww,

Judge.

